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Our nation's public school systems have the primary responsibility for
enabling American youth to function in contemporary society. If we are
committed to the goals of social, economic, and scientific progress, equal
educational quality for our school children must be provided irrespective
of race.' Yet, despite the Supreme Court's frequent emphasis on education2
and the fourteenth amendment's obvious intent to establish racial equal-
ity,3 seemingly sincere efforts to desegregate public schools have progressed
slowly.
Since the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,4 state-enforced segregation in public schools has been repug-
nant to the Constitution. Undoubtedly, many believed that Brown
presaged an end to all segregated education in the public sector, but subse-
quent caselaw has done much to dispel such optimism. Brown has been
* This article is a student work prepared by Glenn Backer, a member of the ST. JOHN'S LAW
REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
' See Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 505 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
801 (1968), where the court states:
For [Horace] Mann believed that public schools were at the source of the democratic
enterprise; his faith, like that of his fellow reformers, was that the public school, by
drawing into the close association of the classroom students from every social, eco-
nomic and cultural background, would serve as an object lesson in equality and broth-
erhood and undermine the social class divisions which he and his colleagues felt were
inimical to democracy.
See Goodman, De Facto Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L.
REv. 275, 366 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Goodman].
2 See Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But see San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
1 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-
47 (1879).
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court faced the problem of determining the constitution-
ality of four de jure segregated school systems. In each case, the pertinent state law either
"requir[ed] or permitt[ed] segregation." Petitioners, therefore, sought a court order to
enable themselves to attend the school in their locality. The Court held that state mandated
public school segregation was unconstitutional and noted "that in the field of public educa-
tion the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." Id. at 495.
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limited to de jure segregation, i.e., segregation produced by state action.
Consequently, segregation has been allowed to flourish in public school
systems so long as there is no demonstrable state involvement. If the re-
sulting de facto segregation is permitted to continue, the hopes aroused by
Brown will remain largely unfulfilled.
THE GENERATING FORCES BEHIND DE FACTO SEGREGATION
Nationally, desegregation has progressed at varying rates. Brown held
the statutorily mandated dual school systems of the South violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Consequently, local
school boards were required "to effectuate a transition to a racially nondis-
criminatory school system." 6 The Court further ordered that the desegrega-
tion proceed "with all deliberate speed."'7 In the North, by contrast, segre-
gated educational facilities arose in the absence of statutory compulsion
and thus have been unaffected by Brown.
Currently, school segregation in the industrial northern cities contin-
ues.' Accounting for its existence are several interrelated factors: (1) the
absence of overt state action; (2) judicial interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment; (3) residential patterns; (4) the neighborhood school policy;
and (5) the selection of construction sites for new schools.
Although racial classifications are "constitutionally suspect" and con-
sequently must be "scrutinized with particular care,"9 courts have upheld
de facto segregation by examining racial separation from the vantage point
of its cause rather than its effect."0 If neither invidious racial classifications
5 Id. In Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1967), the Court held unconstitutional
a de jure segregated school system in Virginia noting that:
[rlacial identification of the system's schools was complete, extending not just to the
composition of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school operations
- faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities. In short, the
State, acting through the local board and school officials, organized and operated a
dual system, part "white" and part "Negro."
See Comment, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility,
39 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 423 (1972) [hereinafter cited as After Swann].
o Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Brown II].
Id.
See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U. S. Nov.
20, 1973) (No. 73-434); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d
209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
1 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 302
U.S. 81, 100 (1943) wherein Mr. Chief Justice Stone elaborated on the unconstitutionality of
racial classifications by stating:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.
For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has
often been held to be a denial of equal protection.
o Cf. Comment, De Facto Segregation - The Northern Problem, 40 CoNN. B.J. 493, 501
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nor other state action causes schools to be racially separated, the resulting
de facto segregation is constitutional. In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of
Education," for example, the constitutionality of the de facto segregated
Cincinnati Public School System was upheld since no state action had
been alleged. The court distinguished between the psychological harm
of segregated education, viz., the impact, and the state's participation,
viz., the cause. Chief Judge Weick found the causation concept to be
controlling:
[A] showing of harm alone is not enough to invoke the remedial powers of
the law. If the state or any of its agencies has not adopted impermissible
racial criteria in its treatment of individuals, then there is no violation of the
Constitution .... 12
By so holding, the courts remain insensitive to the inferior quality of, and
the resultant psychological harm generated by segregated education.
Additionally, a conservative construction of the fourteenth amend-
ment, while perhaps not creating de facto segregation, certainly has fos-
tered it. The fourteenth amendment has been construed to prohibit dis-
crimination without mandating integration, even where state action ex-
ists.'3 Consequently, judicial nonintervention in cases of racial imbalance
in de facto segregated public schools has become the rule. Both the Fifth
and Tenth Circuits have advanced this interpretation by stating that
"Negro children have no constitutional right to the attendance of white
children with them in the public schools."" If this view is generally ac-
cepted, no constitutional attack on de facto segregation via the fourteenth
amendment is maintainable.
While judicial conservatism arguably contributes to continued segre-
gation, there is no question that residential patterns are tied to the creation
of racially segregated school systems. Such patterns develop due to "a
combination of sociological events including non-white migration to the
North, the white exodus to suburban communities and the low economic
status of non-whites . "., However, residential segregation, de facto in
(1966) [hereinafter cited as The Northern Problem]; Comment, De Facto Segregation - The
Elusive Spectre of Brown, 9 VnL. L. REv. 283, 285 (1964) [hereinafter cited as The Elusive
Spectre of Brown].
369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967).
12 Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
" See Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957).
I, Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1960). In Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d
988, 998 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965), the court upheld a de facto
segregated school system in Kansas City by noting:
Although the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits segregation, it does not command
integration of the races in the public schools and Negro children have no constitutional
right to have white children attend with them.
15 The Northern Problem, supra note 10, at 493. For an analysis of "the white exodus" see
After Swann, supra note 5, at 446.
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nature, is not confined to the North but is mirrored in both northern and
southern public schools. Invariably, if children attend the school closest to
their home, 6 a city with de facto segregated residential patterns produces
a de facto segregated school system. Faced with the problem of voluntary
residential segregation, the courts, to date, have viewed their position as
powerless:
It is apparent to all that the difficulty here arises out of residential racial
patterns . . . That such residential segregation actually produces educa-
tional segregation and renders the task of school integration extremely diffi-
cult is obvious. However, it is impossible for the court. . . to abolish the...
housing problem by judicial order as desirable as such might be in the final
solution of the school problem .... 1
The evils of residential segregation are intensified when the neighbor-
hood school policy is implemented by the local school boards. Such pol-
icy-the assignment of a child to the school nearest his home-is widely
adopted throughout the nation.18 Its avowed purposes are to improve the
educational experience for the child, to increase safety by reducing travell-
ing time, to enhance community participation in the school program, and
to facilitate pupil placement. 9 In the absence of gerrymandered district
lines, school construction intentionally perpetuating racial segregation, or
other acts tantamount to de jure segregation, the neighborhood school
policy, until recently, has withstood judicial scrutiny.
Several circuit courts have agreed that the imposition of a neighbor-
hood school policy on a residentially segregated community does not, of
itself, create a constitutional violation. Chief Judge Lewis, speaking for the
Tenth Circuit, has explicitly sanctioned the neighborhood school as a valid
educational concept by noting:
The law of this circuit has been consistently stated ... to be that neighbor-
1, New York and California, like most states in the nation, use the neighborhood school
concept for pupil assignments. See The Elusive Spectre of Brown, supra note 10, at 290.
Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163, 168 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 384 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
IS Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 60 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847
(1967).
" Deal provides a concise summary of the advantages of utilizing the neighborhood school
policy. Chief Judge Weick states:
The neighborhood system is in wide use throughout the nation and has been for many
years the basis of school administration. This is so because it is acknowledged to have
several valuable aspects which are an aid to education, such as minimization of safety
hazards to children in reaching school, economy of cost in reducing transportation
needs, ease of pupil placement and administration through the use of neutral, easily
determined standards, and better home-school communication.
369 F.2d at 60. See Ellis v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 423 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1970);
Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 VnL. L. Rsv. 353, 361 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Maslow]; Comment, De Facto Segregation And the Neighborhood School, 9 WAYNE
L. REv. 514, 523 (1963).
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hood school plans, when impartially maintained and administered, do not
violate constitutional rights even though the result of such plan is racial
imbalance. 20
Furthermore, in Bell v. School City,21 the Seventh Circuit sustained the
constitutionality of a de facto segregated school system in Gary, Indiana.
By so doing, the court approved the city's "honestly and conscientiously
constructed" neighborhood school plan. 2
Difficulties arising from the implementation of a neighborhood school
policy, notwithstanding existing patterns of residential segregation, are
compounded when one considers the issue of new school site location. Mr.
Chief Justice Burger has acknowledged the critical interrelationship be-
tween school construction and residential patterns by stating:
People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in re-
sponse to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the
patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have impor-
tant impact on composition of inner-city neighborhoods.2
The choice of location for new schools in Pontiac, Michigan was chal-
lenged in Henry v. GodseUl,24 but the school board was deemed not to have
violated the Constitution by constructing a school in a predominantly
black area. The district court held that "[tihe choice of a school site based
on density of population and geographic considerations such as distance,
accessibility, ease of transportation. . . is a permissible exercise of admin-
istrative discretion. '25 Subsequently, Griggs v. Cook 2 added further au-
thority to the proposition that school zoning, neutrally administered yet
producing pockets of segregation, could not supply the basis for judicially
mandated desegregation:
What is decided is that the establishment of a school on non-racially moti-
vated standards is not unconstitutional because it fortuitously results in all-
negro or all-white enrollment. The need for education under reasonable con-
ditions supercedes the need for absolute integrated education under unrea-
sonable conditions .... 27
2' United States v. Board of Educ., 459 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1972), vacated sub nom.
Smith v. Board of Educ., 413 U.S. 916 (1973).
21 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
2 Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819, 829 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
2 Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971). Cf. Maslow, supra note 19, at 368.
2 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
11 Id. at 90.
26 272 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ga.), afJ'd, 384 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
2 272 F. Supp. at 169. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,
887-90 (5th Cir. 1966); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 855, 861 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 481
(M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
The Sixth Circuit, in Northcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962), also refused to order desegregation where the only state action
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Deeming de facto segregation constitutional, therefore, has resulted in
the sanctioning of one race schools" and a refusal to alter racial imbal-
ances."8 Mr. Chief Justice Burger, for example, has indirectly indicated
that one race schools are constitutionally acceptable.10 Additionally, the
one race or racially disproportionate school is justified by Justice Harlan's
concept of a "color-blind" Constitution.' Under the "color-blind" test,
courts are precluded from taking any affirmative action based on racial
considerations. The court in Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education," for
example, adhered to this position and refused to correct the racial imbal-
ance which was found to exist in a public school. Strictly construed, the
"color-blind" concept is antithetical to the notion of racial balancing and
has caused warnings that society must choose "between the mutually ex-
clusive goals of color-blindness and color-consciousness.
' ' 3
Although lower federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of de
facto segregated public schools, the Supreme Court has avoided facing the
issue.3 1 In Swann v. Board of Education,3 the Court approached, but did
consisted of neutrally administered school zoning. The court observed:
Minimal requirements for nonracial schools are geographic zoning according to the
capacity and facilities of the buildings and admission to a school according to residence
as a matter of right.
2 See United States v. Board of Educ., 459 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1972), vacated sub nom.
Smith v. Board of Educ., 413 U.S. 916 (1973), where Chief Judge Lewis acknowledged the
constitutionality of a one race school. "The mere existence of one-race schools, whether black
or white, does not establish a constitutional violation." See Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp.
87, 90 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
" See Title IV of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (1971), which states:
"Desegregation" means the assignment of students to public schools and within such
schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but "desegrega-
tion" shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome
racial imbalance.
Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
31 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
11 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967). Chief Judge Lewis, in United
States v. Board of Educ., 459 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1972), vacated sub nom. Smith v. Board
of Educ., 413 U.S. 916 (1973), concurred in the view espoused in Deal by stating:
Without a showing of a constitutional violation on the part of school authorities, equity
does not require a federal court to effect changes in the racial composition of public
schools.
Rice, The Legality Of De Facto Segregation, 10 CATH. LAw. 309, 317 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Rice]. The author reaches the conclusion that "the policy of racial balancing in pupil
assignment to public schools is erroneous in theory and pernicious in effect." For a rebuttal
see Gegan, De Jure Segregation in Education, 11 CATH. LAw. 4, 12 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Gegan].
1' Rice, supra note 33, at 312; see Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 221 (E.D.N.Y.
1964); Comment, De Facto Segregation, 6 WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 41, 52 (1965).
" 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Charlotte-Mecklenburg public school system, located in North
Carolina, had a "long history" of operating de jure segregated schools as a result of govern-
mental and school board policies. In Charlotte, for example, where 21,000 of the 24,000 black
students in the system were enrolled, 14,000 attended schools that were nearly 100% black.
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not reach, the de facto question by holding, inter alia, that once discrimi-
natory state action ceases, further district court involvement is unwar-
ranted.3" Mr. Chief Justice Burger did add the caveat, however, that
"[tihis does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with
future problems . . . ."3
KEYES V. DENVER SCHOOL DISTRICT No. ONE: A TOOL FOR DESEGREGATION
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Keyes v. Denver
School District No. One,38 continued to avoid the issue of the constitution-
ality of pure de facto public school segregation, i.e., segregation without
any link to prior de jure segregation. 39 Nonetheless, Keyes is significant in
that its outer limits have been used subsequently to challenge both de facto
segregation and the neighborhood school concept."0 While this sweeping
result may be suggested by Keyes, it is in direct contrast with the majority
opinion's conservative approach.
Background
In Keyes, parents of children attending school in the Park Hill area
of Denver sought a court order compelling desegregation not only of the
Park Hill schools, but of all Denver schools. The Denver school system,
unlike the traditional dual systems in the South, operated without a statu-
torily mandated policy of educational segregation. Nevertheless, since
1960, a sizeable portion of Denver's black population migrated to the Park
Hill area producing heavily concentrated black neighborhoods. Conse-
quently, racial imbalances in the area's schools developed.4
The racially segregated schools in Park Hill, however, did not result
exclusively from the population shift. Policy decisions by the school au-
thorities contributed to the concentration of black and Hispanic students.
The Barrett Elementary School, for instance, which opened in 1960 was
To undo this situation, the district court ordered both the school board and Dr. John Finger,
an educational expert appointed by the court, to devise viable desegregation plans. Ulti-
mately, the court adopted a revised version of the "Finger Plan" and the plan proposed by a
minority of the school board. On appeal, the court's holding was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
-" Id. at 32.
37 Id.
- 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
"' Mr. Justice Brennan clearly delineated the scope of the decision by noting:
We have no occasion to consider in this case whether a 'neighborhood policy' of itself
will justify racial or ethnic concentrations in the absence of a finding that school
authorities have committed acts constituting de jure segregation.
Id. at 212.
40 See text accompanying notes 108-12 infra.
4 Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 313 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Colo. 1970), modified, 445 F.2d 990
(10th Cir. 1971).
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immediately classified as a desegregated school although such a classifica-
tion was factually unrealistic." In an endeavor to end the racial concentra-
tion, the school board, pursuant to the superintendent's report adopted
resolutions mandating boundary changes and student busing. However,
subsequent to a board election in which integration was a primary issue,
the new board by a four-to-three vote rescinded the resolutions. The newly
elected board then adopted a resolution which required the implementa-
tion of a voluntary student transfer plan. Dissatisfied with the voluntary
plan, the petitioners brought an action to enjoin the rescission of the prior
resolutions and to obtain a court order directing desegregation of the city's
schools.43
The district court, in upholding petitioners' contentions, found that
the Park Hill schools were segregated as a result of affirmative state ac-
tion.44 As to the remaining Denver schools, termed "the core city schools,"
no de jure segregation was noted.4 5 Despite the absence of state action, the
court determined that "a denial of equal opportunity in these schools"'4 ,
existed. Consequently, Judge Doyle included both the Park Hill and "core
city schools" within the ambit of the desegregation order. On appeal, how-
ever, the Tenth Circuit found no justification for the district court's view
pertaining to the "core city schools."47 Thus, while affirming the desegrega-
tion of the Park Hill schools, the court of appeals set aside the remainder
of the lower court's holding.48
The Majority - A Search for De Jure Segregation
The Supreme Court, reacting favorably to the district court's ration-
ale, modified and remanded the decision of the Tenth Circuit. Mr. Justice
Brennan stated that where intentional segregation is found in a "meaning-
ful portion of the school system," a presumption arises that "other segre-
gated schooling within the system is not adventitious."4 The burden of
42 When the school opened in 1960, black students constituted 89.6% of the total student
body. 313 F. Supp. at 64 n.1. During the 1968-69 school year, Barrett had only one white, 12
Hispanics, and 410 black students. Moreover, Barrett had the lowest percentage of white
students among the Park Hill schools. Brief for Petitioner at 17 n.13.
'6 413 U.S. at 192.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970). The Denver school system
functioned without the legislature mandating segregation. Instead, the source of state action
consisted of acts of the school authorities. The Supreme Court noted that the "school board
alone, by use of various techniques such as the manipulation of attendance zones, school site
selection and a neighborhood school policy, created or maintained . . .segregated schools
.... "413 U.S. at 191.
11 313 F. Supp. at 84.
Id.
'7 Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1007.
" 413 U.S. at 208. Although the Court remanded the case to the district court, Justice Powell
believed that the majority opinion "compels the finding on remand that Denver has a dual
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proving5 that district policies toward other segregated schools within the
system contain no elements of intentional segregation then shifts to the
school board. 51 Significantly, a mere showing of de facto segregation result-
ing from the implementation of a neutral neighborhood school policy will
be insufficient to meet this burden."
The use of a presumption by the Supreme Court in school desegrega-
tion cases is not unprecedented. 3 In Swann v. Board of Education,4 for
example, the Court established two presumptions. First, if a school may
be labelled black or white "by reference to racial composition of teachers
and staff, the equality of the buildings and equipment, or the organization
of sports activities, '55 a prima facie violation of the fourteenth amendment
is established. The school board must then assume the burden of ending
all "invidious racial distinctions. ' '5' The weight of this presumption, how-
ever, is somewhat vitiated by the Court's seemingly contradictory reason-
ing that "the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-
race schools . . . is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still
practices discrimination by law. ' 5 7 Secondly, the Court in Swann noted
school system." Thus, the entire Denver system would have to be desegregated "root and
branch." Id. at 237 (concurring opinion).
"o The Court stated that the burden of proof shifts. However, it is widely recognized that the
burden of proof never shifts although the burden of coming forward with an explanation may.
See Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1941);
Polizzi v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 498, 501-02 (6th Cir. 1959). Inadvertently, courts equate
the defendant's burden to come forward with evidence with the burden of proof. Therefore,
in Keyes, the Court is probably referring to the school board's burden of coming forward with
sufficient evidence to rebut the petitioner's presumption. See Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v.
Siefke, 144 N.Y. 354 (1895).
413 U.S. at 208.
s After indicating that the Court would not determine whether the neighborhood school
policy was per se unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
It is enough that we hold that the mere assertion of such a policy is not dispositive
where, as in this case, the school authorities have been found to have practiced dejure
segregation in a meaningful portion of the school system by techniques that indicate
that the "neighborhood school" concept has not been maintained free of manipulation.
Id. at 212.
The presumption is a procedural device not unknown to racial discrimination cases. In an
action challenging the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting blacks from participation as
jurors, a longstanding exclusion was held presumptively to deny equal protection. See Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 235, 252 (1968).
Furthermore, segregation in public housing, where the housing authority acts as agent
for the state, creates a "presumption of discrimination." See Comment, City Housing Author-
ity Intentionally Discriminating in Selection of Public Housing Sites Directed to Select Fu-
ture Sites in Accordance with Specific Plan for Integration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1172, 1176
(1960).
51 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
5 Id. at 18.
5 Id.
11 Id. at 26.
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that school systems with a "history of segregation" and a "substantially
disproportionate. . . racial composition"5 are presumed to be unconstitu-
tional. This finding may be rebutted by proof that the children are as-
signed to schools on a "genuinely nondiscriminatory""9 basis.
It is noteworthy that in Swann, unlike Keyes, the school board was
not required to affirmatively prove a policy of unintentional segregation.
Also, under Swann, a showing of a neighborhood school policy would sat-
isfy the school board's burden of establishing the absence of "invidious
discrimination" or the operation of a "genuinely nondiscriminatory"
school system. Keyes, however, imposes a more demanding burden of proof
on the school boards. More specifically, once intentional segregation in a
meaningful portion of the system is established, the school board is con-
strained to devise a plan to desegregate. Significantly, the entire system
is presumed intentionally segregated. Thus, a showing by the school board
of "isolated and individual" 0 segregation resulting from an impartially
administered neighborhood school policy will not be sufficient to eliminate
the presumption.
Concurring Opinions - A Broader Perspective
The majority in Keyes narrowed the scope of its decision by failing to
evaluate the constitutionality of a neighborhood school policy untainted by
prior acts of de jure segregation.6 The concurring opinions of Justices
Powell and Douglas, however, are addressed precisely to this issue. These
opinions suggest answers to three questions: (1) whether in the absence of
state action, separate educational facilities for blacks and whites consti-
tute a denial of equal protection; (2) whether a duty to eliminate de facto
segregation, with the consequent demise of the neighborhood school con-
cept, can be imposed upon local school boards; and (3) whether the imposi-
tion of the neighborhood school policy on preexisting residential segrega-
tion is sufficient to invoke judicial enforcement of equal protection rights.
Desegregation in the Absence of State Action-The Impact Theory.
To determine if pure de facto segregation is violative of the Constitu-
tion, it must initially be decided whether the Court should employ a cause
or an impact standard. If Brown is construed exclusively in terms of causa-
tion, then public school segregation will be held unconstitutional only
when state action causes or maintains segregation. Such an interpretation,
however, is too narrow an application of the equal protection clause. 2
58 Id.
Id.
413 U.S. at 209.
" See also note 44 supra.
62 Compare Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, rehearing denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973) and United States v.
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Thus, the concurring opinions agree that the distinction between de facto
and de jure segregation should be eliminated 3 and thereby implicitly ad-
here to the impact theory. 4
The effect of separate educational facilities in denying children equal
protection should be analyzed from the vantage point of the psychological
impact. Unfortunately, the extent of the psychological harm resulting from
racial segregation cannot be precisely measured." Still, in Blocker v. Board
of Education," the court recognized the absurdity of adopting adherence
to the de facto - de jure distinction. The court reasoned that the de facto
- de jure dichotomy in no way lessens the damaging effect of segregation
on school children:
They are not so mature and sophisticated as to distinguish between the total
separation of all Negroes pursuant to a mandatory or permissive State stat-
ute based on race and the almost identical situation prevailing in their school
district. The. . . situation generates the same feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community as was found by the Supreme Court in Brown to
flow from substantially similar segregation by operation of State law .... 11
Additionally, an impact analysis should consider the effects of de facto
segregation on scholastic achievement. It is apparent that schools with a
predominantly black population have achievement rates measurably infe-
rior to integrated or predominantly white schools. The substandard quality
of segregated education is reflected in lower achievement in reading com-
prehension, word recognition, spelling, arithmetic computation, and the
Iowa Basic knowledge tests. In Keyes, for example, the achievement rates
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 872 (5th Cir. 1966) with Deal v. Cincinnati Bd.
of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 58-59 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967) and Bell v.
School City, 324 F.2d 209, 212-13 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
'A Mr. Justice Douglas states that "there is no constitutional difference between de jure and
de facto segregation, for each is the product of state actions or policies." 413 U.S. at 216. Mr.
Justice Powell concurs by stating that "[t]here is thus no reason as a matter of constitutional
principle to adhere to the de jure / de facto distinction in school desegregation cases." Id. at
232. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, rehearing denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973); United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 413-14 (5th Cir. 1967) (Gewin, C.J. & Bell, J.,
dissenting) (en banc).
" See The Northern Problem, supra note 10, at 501; The Elusive Spectre of Brown, supra
note 10, at 285.
0 Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
Id.
67 Id. See Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 506 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
801 (1968); Goodman, supra note 1, at 299, where the author states:
Black children forced to attend such a school are demoralized by feelings of isolation
from the white mainstream, and experience the same feelings of inferiority experienced
by children in schools segregated de jure.
See Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 313 F. Supp. 61, 78-80 .(D. Colo. 1970), modified, 445
F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971); Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee, 237 F. Supp. 543, 546
(D. Mass.), vacated, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). See also Maslow, supra note 19, at 356,
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characteristic of the predominantly black and Hispanic schools were well
below the Denver School District average"9 and further inferior to the pre-
dominantly Anglo schools."0
Clearly, the "inherently unequal"'" quality of segregated education
operates whether or not the state created or maintained the system. There-
fore, the concurring opinions properly disregarded the de facto-de jure
distinction and tested the constitutionality of de facto school segregation
in terms of impact rather than cause. Since children in de facto segregated
public schools suffer the same psychological detriment and substandard
quality of education as do those in de jure segregated schools, they too are
denied equal protection." Consequently, this deprivation requires reme-
dial action.
Local School Boards - The Duty to Act
The duty to end de jure segregated public school systems rests with
the local school authorities.7 3 The second Brown v. Board of Education74
decision established "with all deliberate speed" as the operable standard
for such desegregation. Thirteen years later, the Court, in acknowledging
the arduous process of effective desegregation,75 altered this standard. Cur-
rently, "the burden on a school board . . . is to come forward with a plan
where the author states: "That the educational level of children in segregated schools is
markedly below that of their white peers is a matter of common knowledge verified by many
studies."
1 For example, the third grade mean average in the segregated schools was a half-year below
the district average. Brief for Petitioner at 45.
70 The Anglo schools in the district were one and one-third years more advanced than the
segregated schools on the third grade level and more than two years on the fifth grade level.
Id.
71 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
7 Some courts have adopted the propositioh that segregated education is a denial of equal
protection. See Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 880-81,
31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 608-09 (1963); Morean v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97, 100
(1964) (per curiam). Contra, Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 59 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967), wherein Chief Judge Wieck narrowly construed the legal
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to preclude its application absent state action.
11 See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 152 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, rehearing denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973), where Judge Dyer stated:.
"[Ilt is the duty of the school officials to forthwith formulate and implement such student
assignment plan as will remedy the discrimination which has been found to exist." See also
Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1960).
14 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). See Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 193 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), wherein Judge Kaufman adopted the reasoning of Brown II
by stating: "Having created a segregated school, the Constitution imposed upon the Board
the duty to end segregation, in good faith, and with all deliberate speed."
75 See Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1960), wherein Chief Judge Johnson
capsulized the process of desegregation: "It is, we think quite generally recognized that a
solution to the problem of effecting desegregation will in most instances have to come through
a series of progressive, transitional steps."
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that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now."7" In essence; the objective of all desegregation plans is "to convert
to a unitary system in which racial discrimination [will] be eliminated
root and branch."" Therefore, expansion of the school boards' duty to
eliminate racial imbalance in de facto segregated systems seems a logical
extension of prior judicial directives.
In imposing a constitutional duty on local school boards to operate
"integrated school systems,"7 Mr. Justice Powell takes a position which
arguably can be reconciled with Mr. Justice Harlan's concept of a "color-
blind" Constitution. In applying the "color-blind" standard, school boards
are prohibited from considering race as a legitimate means of denying
students equal educational opportunities. 79 Implicit in Mr. Justice Powell's
formulation of an integrated school. system, however, is the distinction
between racial considerations which deprive constitutional rights and
those required to insure compliance with the Constitution.s Clearly, to
11 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
17 Id. at 437-38. The courts have rejected any attempt to implement desegregation plans
which have no impact on the racial concentration. In Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F.2d 798, 809
(8th Cir. 1961), the court stated:
The obligation to disestablish imposed segregation is not met by applying placement
or assignment standards, educational theories or other criteria so as to produce the
result of leaving the previous racial situation existing as it was before.
See Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1960).
11 Mr. Justice Powell states that "the constitutional obligation of public authorities in the
school districts throughout our country [is] to operate integrated school systems." 413 U.S.
at 236 (emphasis in original) (concurring opinion). Justice Powell, therefore, adopts the view
expressed by Judge Wright in United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,
869 (5th Cir. 1966). There, the court established the duty-to-integrate doctrine by holding
"that the only adequate redress for a previously overt system-wide policy of segregation
directed against Negroes as a collective entity is a system-wide policy of integration." (em-
phasis in original). See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142,
145 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, rehearing denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973); Hobsen
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 505 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 801 (1968).
1, See Title IV of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (1971). N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3201
(McKinney 1972) provides:
No person shall be refused admission into or be excluded from any public school in
the state of New York on account of race ....
Judge Wright distinguished color-blindness and color-consciousness by stating:
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict with the
equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes
a burden must not be based on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But
the Constitution is color conscious to prevent- discrimination being perpetuated and
to undo the effects of past discrimination.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 869 (5th Cir. 1966). The
Supreme Court of New Jersey acknowledged this distinction in Morean v. Board of Educ.,
42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97, 100 (1964):
Constitutional color blindness may be wholly apt when the frame of reference is an
attack on official efforts toward segregation; it is not generally apt when the attack is
on official efforts toward the avoidance of segregation.
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meet a constitutional obligation of conducting an integrated school system,
racial considerations are absolutely essential." The preclusion of color-
consciousness in the effort to integrate will, in effect, perpetuate racially
distinct schools.
Local school boards compelled to integrate must, therefore, develop
plans designed to achieve a racial balance throughout the school system.82
The necessary consequences of such formulations will be: (1) the demise
of the neighborhood school concept; (2) increased judicial involvement
with school site locations; and (3) re-evaluation of methods for teacher
assignments.
The neighborhood school policy, which mandates that a child attend
the school nearest his home, is neither "immutable" nor "sacrosanct."8
It cannot lawfully be employed to perpetuate the confinement of blacks in
an area initially demarcated by governmental acts. 5 Clearly, the neighbor-
hood concept is at odds with the duty to conduct racially balanced schools.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger has indicated that once the district court deter-
See Gegan, supra note 33, at 10, where the author states:
Yet, the difference between overt classification by race and functionally non-racial
measures adopted out of racial considerations is significant in an equal protection
analysis.
" See Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1967), where Judge Smith in
upholding a plan designed to eliminate de facto school segregation stated, with respect to race
consciousness:
Where its use is to insure against, rather than to promote deprivation of equal educa-
tional opportunity, we cannot conceive that our courts would find that the state denied
equal protection to either race by requiring its school boards to act with awareness of
the problem.
See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 877 (5th Cir. 1966); Wanner
v. County School Bd., 357 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1966); Dowell v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp.
971, 976 (W.D. Okla. 1965), modified, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931
(1967). Cf. Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 262 (8th Cir. 1960).
82 There is a paucity of case law supporting the proposition that a school board must correct
racially imbalanced schools. See Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382
P.2d 878, 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 610 (1963), where Chief Judge Gibson did, however, uphold
such a duty:
The right to an equal opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of
segregation require that school boards take steps . to alleviate racial imbalance in
schools regardless of its cause (emphasis added).
Contra, United States v. Board of Educ., 459 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir. 1972), vacated sub nom.
Smith v. Board of Educ., 413 U.S. 916 (1973); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 666
(8th Cir. 1966); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 60 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 847 (1967); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 924 (1964). See also Rice, supra note 33, at 318, where the author states: "[T]he policy
of racial balancing in pupil assignment to public schools is erroneous in theory and pernicious
in effect."
83 Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 195 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1961).
85 Id.
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mines that the school system is unconstitutionally segregated, the school
board must devise an effective solution. Consequently, to eliminate de
facto segregation in the public schools, the school boards must devise a
transfer program that considers a pupil's race as a factor in his school
placement. 6 Perpetuation of the status quo through the neighborhood sys-
tem is not "per se adequate to meet the remedial responsibilities of local
school boards. 8
7
In addition to limiting the justification for neighborhood schools, the
requirement of racial balance within a school system will have a direct
impact on the location of new public schools. The issue will no longer be
whether the need for a new school outweighs the detrimental impact of a
one race school.88 Instead, the court will be forced to determine whether
the location of a new school expedites integration,89 and, more specifically,
11 The Supreme Court has recently decided to hear a case involving the adoption of a metro-
politan plan designed to eliminate de jure segregation in Detroit's public schools. Previously,
the Sixth Circuit adopted the district court's rationale that an effective desegregation plan
would have to reach beyond the boundaries of the Detroit school district. Bradley v. Milliken,
484 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1973) (No. 73-434).
In Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963), the Court rejected a transfer plan which
permitted students to transfer from a school to which they were assigned because of rezoning
back to their original segregated school where they were in the racial majority. Mr. Justice
Clark held the plan unconstitutional by noting that "the transfer system proposed lends itself
to perpetuation of segregation." Id. at 686. He continued:
While transfers are available to those who choose to attend school where their race is
in the majority, there is no provision whereby a student might transfer upon request
to a school in which his race is in a minority, unless he qualifies for a "good cause"
transfer.
Id. at 686-87.
The "majority to minority" transfer plan would be an effective means of achieving
integrated education. The plan permits students assigned to a school in which their race
exceeds more than half the total school population to transfer, without the necessity of
showing good cause, to a school where their race comprises the minority. Such a policy
"enables Negro children trapped in Negro neighborhoods .. to transfer from predominantly
Negro schools to schools where they can attain an integrated education." Dowell v. School
Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971, 977 (W.D. Okla. 1965), modified, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 931 (1967).
Mr. Justice Powell supports the use of busing to achieve integration, but only on a
limited scale. He noted:
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require large-scale or long-distance
transportation of students . . .I record my profound misgivings. Nothing in our Con-
stitution commands or encourages any such court-compelled disruption of public edu-
cation . . . .
This obviously does not mean that bus transportation has no place in public school
systems or is not a permissible means in the desegregative process.
413 U.S. at 238, 243 (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original). He concluded that "sound
discretion under the circumstances" is the standard to determine the extent of student
busing. Id. at 244.
11 Davis v. School Comm'r, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
See Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163, 169 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd 384 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 481, 489 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub
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whether such placement reduces the existing racial imbalance.,' Since
school site location is a decisive factor in controlling residential patterns,
altering site selection criteria will have the further effect of changing the
composition of neighborhoods,9' thereby stimulating integration.
Finally, an integrated system requires a teacher assignment program
which promotes racial balance within the schools." Such a system man-
dates that faculty assignments be made with the specific intent of ending
all traces of a one race faculty. The ethnic breakdown of the assigned
teachers to a large degree determines the categorizing of the school as
either racially balanced or predominantly one race. 3 In United States v.
Jefferson County Board of Education,4 the Fifth Circuit recognized the
importance of faculty integration by observing:
A Negro faculty makes a Negro school; the Negro school continues to offer
inferior educational opportunities; and the school system continues its psy-
chological harm to Negroes.
Enlarging the Scope of State Action
Mr. Justice Powell's opinion that school boards have an affirmative
duty to operate integrated systems, if adopted, would have a revolutionary
impact on American education. A more cautious position, perhaps, is
taken by Mr. Justice Douglas, whose view of state action is broad enough
to permit increased judicial intervention where de facto segregation is
discovered. By so doing, he resolves Swann's previously unanswered ques-
tions. There, Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated:
We do not reach. . . the question whether a showing that school segregation
is a consequence of other types of state action, without any discriminatory
action by the school authorities is a constitutional violation .... 17
nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). See generally Maslow, supra note 19, at
368.
,1 Chief Judge Weick, in Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 61 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967), rejected the notion of a duty to conduct racially balanced
schools. Furthermore, he noted that there is no "like duty to select new school sites solely in
furtherance of such a purpose."
' See text accompanying note 23 supra.
See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 151-52 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, rehearing denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973), where the court
required the school authorities to achieve "a ratio of mexican-american teachers to total
faculty that approaches the ratio of mexican-american students to the total student popula-
tion."
1 See Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 323 (4th Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion).
94 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
11 Id. at 892. The court imposed on the school board the "affirmative duty to break up the
historical pattern of segregated faculties . Id. at 895.
'6 413 U.S. at 214-17.
402 U.S. at 23.
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Mr. Justice Douglas holds that the state action doctrine is applicable to
segregation where there is, paradoxically, either culpable state inaction or
participation in the continuance of segregated residential patterns. Conse-
quently, a school board, with knowledge of residential segregation in a
community, could no longer implement the neighborhood school policy
without subsequent efforts to undo the resulting gross racial imbalance in
the schools. Such inaction on its part would constitute a definitive policy.
8
The local board's failure to eradicate the segregated system it inadvert-
ently created would not be shielded from the label of state action. 9
Expanding this rationale, one might consider the state's role in public
housing '00 as establishing the necessary foundation for judicial elimination
of de facto segregated schools. State sanctioned construction of public
housing at sites designed to create or maintain racial segregation arguably
constitutes unconstitutional state action within the ambit of the four-
teenth amendment. 0 1 If the neighborhood school concept were maintained
under these circumstances, the segregated housing would constitute a
"continuing cause"'" of de facto segregation in the schools. Thus, such
11 See Dowell v. School Bd. of Okla., 244 F. Supp. 971, 975 (W.D. Okla. 1965), modified, 375
F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967), where the court held that inaction by
the local board represented a specific program. "[A] school system does not remain static,
and the failure to adopt an affirmative policy is itself a policy ......
11 In Hart v. Community School Bd., Civil No. 72-1041, at 85-86 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 28, 1974),
Judge Weinstein astutely pointed out:
[W]hen racial characteristics determine place-of-residence, as undoubtedly they
often do in our society, then the board's use of a "neighborhood" or residential criterion
in student assignment . . . constitutes a racial classification once removed. To the
extent that racial characteristics determine or have determined place-of-residence, the
school board's use of a residential criterion effectively implicates the state in racial
discrimination.
See Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), where the court held,
inter alia, that the neighborhood school policy established in 1949 might be unconstitutional
considering the "changing circumstances." See also Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent
School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, rehearing denied,
413 U.S. 922 (1973).
11 Our government is "committed to a policy of balanced and dispersed public housing."
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 390 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
See Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th
Cir. 1973). See also Title IV of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970); Fair
Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3608(d)(5) (1970).
Mr. Justice Douglas notes:
When a State forces, aids, or abets, or helps create a racial "neighborhood," it is a
travesty of justice to treat that neighborhood as sacrosanct in the sense that its creation
is free from the taint of state action.
413 U.S. at 216 (concurring opinion). See Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1971); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d
108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D.
Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296
F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
02 Comment, City Housing Authority Intentionally Discriminating in Selection of Public
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state action in public housing could conceivably constitute the state in-
volvement necessary to render the neighborhood school unconstitutional. 0 3
Such analysis cannot, however, be applied to patterns of segregation
created and maintained solely by private citizens. For example, judicial
notice of a white community's resistance to blacks seeking to purchase
homes in the neighborhood is not tantamount to an acknowledgement of
state action."' Unless they seek court enforcement of a discriminatory
restrictive covenant,105 private individuals are permitted to discriminate
without fear of invoking the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment.
It is apparent that the concurring opinions have laid a foundation for
achieving educational equality.' °" Unfortunately, the majority of the Court
refrained from adopting the far-reaching views of Justices Powell and
Douglas. 0 7 Nevertheless, the ideas expressed by the concurring Justices
have affected subsequent case law.
JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE KEYES RATIONALE
Hart v. Community School Board
The concurring opinions in Keyes have recently been expanded by
Housing Sites Directed to Select Future Sites in Accordance with Specific Plan for
Integration, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1172, 1178 (1969).
"03 In Holland v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 258 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1958), the court found
state action, for desegregation purposes, in a city ordinance requiring residential segregation.
Judge Rives stated:
In the light of compulsory residential segregation of the races by city ordinance, it is
wholly unrealistic to assume that the complete segregation existing in the public
schools is either voluntary or the incidental result of valid rules ....
z See Dowell v. School Bd. of Okla., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Okla. 1965), modified, 375 F.2d
158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
05 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
IN If the opinions of Justices Powell and Douglas gain widespread acceptance, the authority
of such cases as Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 268 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. La. 1967), will
be severely weakened. The Hall court upheld de facto segregation which came about after
the elimination of de jure segregation:
If the desegregation plan presently in effect has, in fact, ended de jure segregation in
the schools, and if, because of deliberate, free choice, de facto segregation continues
to exist, such a state of affairs would not require the conclusion that the plan in
operation fails to meet constitutional standards.
Id. at 926-27.
"I It should be noted that Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented on two grounds. First, he reasoned
that the majority erred in equating a legislatively mandated segregated school system, as in
Brown, with the Denver school system. Although state created or maintained discrimination
is unconstitutional, Justice Rehnquist distinguished the situation presented in Keyes:
[Tihe consequences of manipulative drawing of attendance zones in a school district
the size of Denver does not necessarily result in a denial of equal protection to all
minority students within the district.
413 U.S. at 254-55. Secondly, he noted that since the district court had viewed the Park Hill
schools separately from the core-city schools, the Supreme Court was thereby precluded from
interrelating the two. Thus, no presumption arising from the Park Hill situation could be
applied to the core-city schools by the Court.
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Judge Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York in Hart v. Community School Board. 0o Plaintiffs sought
a court order requiring Community School Board 21 to end the racial
imbalance at Mark Twain Junior High School in Brooklyn, New York. In
1973, the ethnic breakdown of the school population was 43.3% black,
38.6% Hispanic, and 18.1% other.' This breakdown was in striking con-
trast to the other more racially balanced junior high and intermediate
schools in the district. Moreover, Mark Twain had the lowest average daily
attendance and reading scores of all the junior high schools in the dis-
trict."0
Although the policy adopted by the community school board was not
the sole cause of racial imbalance at Mark Twain Junior High School, it
nevertheless exacerbated the situation. Prior to September 1966, Public
Schools 216 and 212 graduated their predominantly white sixth grade
classes into Mark Twain. However, as a consequence of adjustments in
school zoning, effective September 1966, subsequent graduates from these
elementary schools would no longer attend Mark Twain. Furthermore, the
community school board rejected both a plan for rezoning and the Chan-
cellor's proposal designed to improve the racial balance of the school.
Instead, the board implemented a free choice plan which ultimately failed
to alter Mark Twain's racial imbalance.
Judge Weinstein embraced the views expressed in Keyes' concurring
opinions and determined that there exists a duty to integrate and to main-
tain racially balanced school systems. In declaring Mark Twain to be un-
constitutionally segregated, Judge Weinstein concluded:
[R]acial segregation in public schools violates the equal protection clause
absent statutory compulsion or authorization and absent even a finding of
'unlawful segregative design,'.. . not only by reason and authority, but also
empirically, by the fact that such segregation inflicts upon the segregated,
non-white students the selfsame harm which the Constitution as interpreted
in Brown I sought to prevent. '
The court qualified its holding by noting that the elimination of a de
facto racial imbalance would be precluded if deemed "clearly impracti-
cal.""' This qualification was considered inapplicable in the case at bar,
and the board was ordered to devise and submit a desegregation plan
which would effectively equalize Mark Twain's racial make-up with that
of the other junior high schools in the district. Further, Judge Weinstein
recognized the interrelationship between racially imbalanced housing and
segregated schools. Accordingly, he ordered the New York City Housing
108 Civil No. 72-1041 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1974).
l Id. at 19.
Id. at 17, 18, 26.
Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 101.
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Authority and the federal housing authorities to formulate a joint plan
designed to encourage white families to move into proposed publicly fi-
nanced housing in the area. In its rejection of the de jure-de facto distinc-
tion, Hart represents a significant development of the ideas enunciated in
the Keyes' concurring opinions.
New York - Fertile Soil for Desegregation
Judge Weinstein felt that his opinion was "congruent with New York
State policy.""' 3 However, New York courts have moved cautiously in rec-
ognizing the duty of local school boards to operate integrated school sys-
tems. To date, there has been no resolution of the constitutional issue as
to whether a petitioner can compel a school district to correct racially
imbalanced schools.
The New York Court of Appeals has sustained the Commissioner of
Education's directive to local boards to take effective action to end all
racial imbalances in the public schools."' The City of Rochester, in compli-
ance with the Commissioner's directive, implemented a noncompulsory
"Open Enrollment Plan""' and a voluntary transfer plan."' Although both
plans were validated by lower New York courts, it was emphasized in both
instances that no child was compulsorily removed from the neighborhood
school." 7 The courts' emphasis on voluntariness implies that racial balanc-
ing is permissible provided the neighborhood school is maintained.
In Balaban v. Rubin,"' the Court of Appeals was forced to determine
the validity of a New York City Board of Education districting plan. Pur-
suant to the board's scheme, the student body of Junior High School 237
was to be composed equally of blacks, Puerto Ricans, and whites. Chief
Judge Desmond upheld the plan because "it exclude[d] no one from any
school and ha[d] no tendency to foster or produce racial segregation."",
However, the force of the court's seemingly atypical decision was substan-
"3 Id. at 104.
Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1965) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965). The Board of Regents pursuant to section 270 of the New York
Education Law had "declared racially imbalanced schools to be educationally inadequate."
Id. at 267, 206 N.E.2d at 175, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 80. The Commissioner executed this policy
decision "by directing local boards to take steps to eliminate racial imbalance." Id., 206
N.E.2d at 175-76, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 80. The court upheld the discretionary action of the
Commissioner by stating that "[d]isagreement with the sociological, psychological and edu-
cational assumptions relied on by the Commissioner cannot be evaluated by this court." Id.,
206 N.E.2d at 176, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 80. See N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 207, 301, 305 (McKinney
1972).
" DiSano v. Storandt, 22 App. Div. 2d 6, 253 N.Y.S.2d 411 (4th Dep't 1964).
"' Etter v. Littwitz, 47 Misc. 2d 473, 262 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965).
'7 See notes 115 & 116 supra.
i8 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
Id. at 199, 193 N.E.2d at 377, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
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tially weakened by its tenacious clinging to the neighborhood school con-
cept. The court emphasized:
There are no oppressive results of the choice here made by the board. No
child will have to travel farther to new School 275 than he would have to go
to get to his "neighborhood" school. 20
In view of these precedents, it would appear that New York courts will
sustain the plans of local school boards establishing racially balanced
schools only where the neighborhood school concept remains inviolate.
An examination of the school districts in Long Island's Nassau and
Suffolk Counties illustrates the impact that compulsory integration would
have on the de facto segregated school systems in New York. Currently,
as a consequence of increased racial residential concentration, 12 Long Is-
land schools are revealing marked tendencies toward segregation."' Per-
haps more significantly, the concentration of blacks in several schools
120 Id.
"I U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 2 CENSUS OF POPULATION 17-22 (1970).
2 The following tables highlight the most racially imbalanced school districts in Nassau and
Suffolk Counties:
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENTS BY RACE, 1970-71













Kings Park 0.3 99.3
Hauppauge 0.2 98.8
DE FACTO SEGREGATION
exceeds the percentage of blacks in the community. 23 Therefore, as the
number of black families residing in a community increases, a dispropor-
tionately greater increase in the degree of de facto segregation in the neigh-
borhood school results. Such relationship illustrates the principle that
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF BY RACE 1970-71
School District Negro Caucasian 224
NASSAU
Roosevelt 29.6 68.4 226
Hempstead 27.3 71.7 227
Westbury 14.0 85.7 228
Oceanside 0.4 99.2 229
Syosset 0.7 98.8 230
Floral Park ---- 100.0 231
SUFFOLK
Wyandanch 36.5 61.4 233
Bridgehampton ---- 100.0 234
Quogue ..-- 100.0 235
Smithtown 1.3 98.3 236
Kings Park 0.3 99.4 237
Hauppauge 1.5 97.5 238
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, RACIAL ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS AND
STAFF IN NEw YORK STATE 1970-71, at 28-82.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE COMMUNITY By RACE 1970-71
Community Negro Caucasian 243
NASSAU
Roosevelt 67.53 31.52 245
Hempstead 35.81 63.19 246
Westbury 8.93 90.57 247
Oceanside 0.25 99.54 248
Syosset 1.01 98.61 249
Floral Park 0.41 99.24 250
SUFFOLK
Wyandanch 59.50 39.64 252
Bridgehampton 20.51 78.94 253
Quogue 19.88 79.08 254
Smithtown 1.50 97.96 255
Kings Park 0.14 99.53 256
Hauppauge 0.35 99.45 257
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 2 CENSUS OF POPULATION 32-47 (1970). The percentages do not total
100 since Puerto Rican, Indian, and Oriental students have been excluded. These groups
comprise a consistently small percentage of the total school population in each district.
" See Tables I and III, supra note 122.
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rigid adherence to the neighborhood school concept in conjunction with
segregated residential patterns will invariably produce de facto segregated
schools. Furthermore, statistics disclose that several districts with signifi-
cant racial imbalances contain faculties largely composed of members of
the predominant race 2 4 thereby accentuating the one race appearance of
the schools.
If school boards were compelled to achieve racial balance, Nassau and
Suffolk County school systems would undergo a significant transformation.
Initially, compulsory racial balancing would result in the demise of the
neighborhood school policy. Once a racial balance is achieved, adjustments
in teacher employment practices would be carried out with the intent of
reinforcing this balance. Unfortunately, the current New York approach
with its mandate that neighborhood schools remain intact is too conserva-
tive to implement these desirable changes.
CONCLUSION - THE PROSPECT OF EQUALITY
The purpose of the fourteenth amendment cannot be achieved unless
we are willing to accept changes in our institutions and ideas. In this
regard, legislators continue to enact statutes in compliance with the
amendment's intent to eradicate all traces of servitude and to establish
true equality.21 Civil rights leaders alert the people to the necessity for
peaceful cooperation among the races. The real solution, however, to the
inequitable economic and social conditions existing between the races lies
not in legislative fiat or political speeches, but in the educational system.
Diligent efforts "to help youngsters of diverse heritages and backgrounds
to understand, appreciate, and come to terms with one another as individ-
uals rather than as stereotypes' ' 26 must be a national priority.
The Supreme Court in Keyes has taken a bold step toward achieving
equal educational opportunities for all children regardless of race. How-
ever, the Court has, once more, failed to determine the constitutionality
of the neutrally administered neighborhood school policy. When this issue
is squarely faced, hopefully, the Court will recognize that "adventitious"
segregation is as harmful to school children as segregation mandated or
encouraged by the state. For now, however, proponents of racially balanced
school systems must seek comfort in the Hart decision and hope it foresha-
dows the future of integrated education.
24 See Tables I and I, supra note 122.
25 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).
' Goodman, supra note 1, at 366.
